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this Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663, 677 n. 11 (1974). 
FACTS: Title 20 of the Law, of Puerto Rico§ 689 sets forth 
the qualifications for registration as a licensed engineer, 
architect, or surveyor. Applicants for registration in the 
appellant's registry must be citizens of the United States. 
An exception is made for non-citizens employed by "instru-
mentalities of the Government of the Commonwealth," who may 
receive a "conditional certificate" for the period of time 
in which they are so employed. App. toJ.S. 10a-13a. 
Appellees brought separate suits challenging the citizen-
ship·requirement. Appellee Otero, a native of Mexico who is 
- not a citizen of the United States and resides in Puerto Rico, 
'-- · ·· 
was denied registration because she did not meet the citizen-
ship requirement. The USDC held that the citizenship_require-
ment was unconstitutional under In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 
(1973), and directed appellants to license Otero as an engineer. 
Appellee Nogueiro, a native of Spain residing as an alien in 
Puerto Rico, was working as an engineer for the Municipality of 
Carolina pursuant to a conditional license; his application 
for a full license was denied. He brought suit against appellants, 
and judgment was entered in his favor on authority of the Otero 
decision. District Judge Pesquera dissented in both cases for 
the reasons stated in his dissent in Ramos v. United States Civil 
Service Commission, 376 F.Supp. 361 (DPR 1974), appeal pending No. 
~ 74-216, in which he expressed iiis agreement with MR. JUSTICE 





413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
The appellants have filed a single jurisdictional statement 
to appeal both judgments. Sup. Ct. Rule 15(3). The appeal is 
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253; see Calero-Toledo, supra, 
I 
416 U.S., at 669-676 (statutes of Puerto Rico are state statutes 
for purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act). 
CONTENTIONS: Appellants advance three contentions: (1) 
The USDC concluded that it had jurisdiction over the case by 
virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 since the suit had been founded upon 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellants contend that the court was in--correct in this holding, analogizing to District of Columbia v. 
Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). This Court found it unnecessary 
to resolve this issue in Calero-Toledo, supra, because it con-
cluded that there was clearly $10,000+ in controversy. 416 
U.S., at 677, n. 11. The USDC for DPR has held that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 does apply to Puerto Rico, Marin v. Univ. of 
Puerto Rico, 346 F.Supp. 470 (1972), 377 F.Supp. 613 (1974), 
and CA 1 has also so held, distinguishing Carter. Orti z v. 
Colon, F.2d (No. 74-1115, Feb. 28, 1975). Appellants 
contend that the issue is important and should be resolved by 
this Court. 
(2) Appellants contend that the USDC should have abstained, 
Harris County Comm. Court v. Moore, __ U.S. __ (1975). The 
local Constitution contains a broad antidiscrimination provision, 
and 20 L.P.R.A. § 689 should have been construed by local courts 
• in the context of the Civil Code. The USDC declined to abstain 
because "The statutory requirement of citizenship is clear and 
, 
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- unmistakable, and no conceivable gloss placed upon it by the 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico could turn aside plaintiff's 
~ 
argument Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248-50 (1967). 11 
(3) Appellants contend that strict scrutiny, while per-
haps appropriate for application to the states under Griffiths, 
l 
should not be applied to Puerto Rico because of its special 
status as a Commonwealth. The Fourteenth Amendment has nev  er 
been held expressly to apply to Puerto Rico. Calero-Toledo, 
supra, 416 U.S., at 668, n. 5. Courts have been able to hedge 
their rulings by finding that under either the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments a certain statute could or could not stand; see, e.g., 
Calero-Toldeo, supra; Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 
43-44 (1970). Such an escape route may not be available in this 
case. Compare ·Griffiths, supra, and Sugarman, supra, with Mow 
Wong Sun, No. 73-1956, and Weinberger v. Diaz, No. 73-1046. 
Appellants contend that the citizenship requirement is warranted 
because of the "special and unique situation of Puerto Rico in 
regard to the nature of the alien problem," Ptn 16. In the USDC 
appellanrn sought to justify the statute in terms of protecting 
Puerto Rico from poor creditor risks and insuring that engineers 
would satisfy the contractor liability requirements established 
by law. 
DISCUSSION: Except for the abstention contention, which 
was correctly resolved below, the issues raised in this appeal 
are difficult. The jurisdictional issue has been before the 
• Court recently in Colon v. Ortiz, A-818 (stay granted- pending 








probable jurisdiction or postpones jurisdiction in that case, 
as issuance of the stay would suggest it may well do, then the 
§ 1983 issue may be decided. Holding the present appeal pending 
docketing of the Colon case might be unusual, but there is also 
a second basis for holding the appeal in this case. The opinion 
of USDC does not ~ndicate whether the court is applying the 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Since Mow Wong Sun and Diaz 
have been set for reargurnent, this appeal could well be affected 
by those cases (especially given the division expressed at 
Conference). If the standard for citizenshlp classifications 
varies depending on whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment 
. . 
applies, then presumably this case should be remanded to USDC 
for consideration in the first instance of the applicable con-
Unless there is a disposition to hold stitutional provision. 
\ 
the case, the appeal should be noted since it presents important 
issue s not heretofore resolved by this Court. 
There is a response. 
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No. 74-1267 Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and 
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero 
The purpose of this memo, dictated during the sunnner, 
is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to record 
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of 
the opinions and briefs. 
-/( 1'( I'( --Jc ;'( 
The case is here on appeal from a three-judge district 
court for the District of Puerto Rico. 
We took the case to decide whether Puerto Rico is a 
"state or territory" within the meaning of§ 1983. 
My understanding is that Puerto Rico is a coi nwealth, 
• • . '-5 'C...,-f . . . 
and is neither a state nor a territory. But -the A s t Cire~t 
-~ considered it to be analogous to a state or territory 
for the purpose of applying constitutional rights and certain 
federal statutes. 
The briefs are not particularly helpful, and the issue 
is of considerable importance to Puerto Rico and the courts 
that sit there. 
I will need help from one of my clerks, particularly 
as to the status of Puerto Rico under the controlling federal 
statutes. The brief on behalf of the public authorities 
there argues that extension of federal-court jurisdiction 
(based on federal statutes) to Puerto Rico would constitute 
a serious intrusion on its "state's rights". 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
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No. 74-1267 Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and 
Survezors v. Flores de Otero 
. The purpose of this memo, dictated during the sumner, 
is ~o aid my memory as to th~ issues presented, and to record 
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of 
the opinions and briefs. 
* * * * * 
The · case is here on 'a•ppeal from, a three-judge district 
court for the District of Puerto Rico. 
We took the case to decide whether Puerto Rico is a 
"state or territory" with~n the meaning of I 1983. 
My understanding is that Puerto Rico is a cOD1Donwealth, 
and is _neither a state nor a territory. But the First Circuit 
has considered it to be analogous to a state or territory 
for the purpose of applying constitutional rights and certain 
federal statutes. 
' l 
The briefs are not ·particularly helpful, and the issue 
is of consid~rable importance to Puerto Rico and the courts 
n 
that sit there. 
I will need help · from one of my clerks, particularly 
as to the status of Puerto Rico under the controlling federal 
statutes. The brief on behalf of the public authorities 
there argues that extension of federal-court jurisdiction 
{based on federal statutes) to Puerto Rico would constitute 
a serious intrusion on its "state's rights". 
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I recommend affirrnance. ~-.· V 
The really troublesome issue in this case is whether 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to Puerto Rico. I think that the 
-. 
district court handled the other issues (abstention and the 
merits) correctly and therefore will not discuss them. 
Appellants stress the independent and autonomous 
status of Puerto Rico in arguing that it is not a "State or 
Territory" within the meaning of§ 1983. Before the early 
1950's Puerto Rico was unquestionably a "territory," and 
federal powers relating to its governance were extremely broad. 
In 1950-1952 Puerto Rico drafted its own constitution and 
became a Commonwealth • 
.---- ....-.~~------~ With the passage of P. Law 600 Puerto 
Rico formally acquired the type of local governmental autonomy 
which is associated with the states in our federal structure. 
Appellants argue that, because of its autonomous status, 







of Columbia, which was held not to be a "State or Territory" 
within§ 1983 in District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 
(1973). 
Appellant has the whole thing backwards. In Carter ~-v--<... 
the Court said that§ 1983 was enacted, in 1871, "primarily 
in response to the unwillingness or inability of the state 
governments to enforce their own laws against those violating 
the civil rights of others." 409 U.S. at 426. II .. ['iE]he 
6-rv 
/1'g7> 
need for some form of federal intervention was clear [but] Congress 
had neither the means nor the authority to exert any direct 
control, on a day-to-day basis, over the actions of state 
officials." 409 U.S. at 427. Section 1983 was passed to give 
the judiciary some supervisory power over unconstitutional 
actions by state officials. Congress did possess "plenary 
power over the Territories," but, "[£]or practical reasons., . 
effective federal control over the activities of territorial 
officials was virtually impossible." 409 U.S. at 430. In 1874 
the statutory provision was extended to cover territories 
without explanation. 
In Carter the Court said that 
There was no need ... to create federal court 
jurisdiction for the District of Columbia. Even 
prior to 1871, the courts of the District possessed 
general jurisdiction over bo_th federal and local 
matters. • . . . Moreover, . . . Congress . . . was 
authorized ... to exercise plenary power over the 
District of Columbia and its officers ...• And 
since the District is itself the seat of the 





observe and, to a large extent, supervise 
the activities of local officials. 
409 U.S. at 429. 
Puerto Ri~o, in contrast, has the freedom from 
3. 
direct federal interference that is found in the states. :r~ 
Calero-Toledo v . Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), 
the Court held that the Corrnnonwealth was a state for purposes 
of the Three-J udge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), for 
precisely this reason. The policy of comity behind that statute 
was said to be equally appropriate when Puerto Rican statutes 
were enjoined, for the Corrnnonwealth shared with the states its 
sovereignity over local matters. 
(The above analysis is heavily influenced by 
the persuasive reasoning of Judge Aldrich in Ortiz v. Colon, 511 
F. 2d 1080 (CA 1, 1975).) 
Section 1983 clearly applied to Puerto Rico before it 
became a corrnnonwealth for it was then a "Territory" within the 
terms of the statute. There has been no indication that, in 
conferring Corrnnonwealth status, Congress intended to modify 
that coverage. Public Law 600, among other things, repealed 
part of the Jones Act of 1917, the basic federal law which 
had governed Puerto Rico as a territory, and renamed the remainder 
of the Act as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act. Section 9 
of that renamed Act provides: "The statutory laws of the United 






and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States ... " 
Since§ 1983 applied before the change to Commonwealth status, 
it would appear to still be applicable. 
Appellant's argument seems to boil down to its 
assertion that Puerto Rico, like the District of Columbia, 
is "unique" and that§ 1983 therefore should not be extended to 
embrace action by the Commonwealth. But "uniqueness," in itself, 
is no answer when the purpose of the statute points in the other 
direction. Puerto Rico, in becoming a Commonwealth, seems to 
have moved away from territorial status and towards statehood. 
It would be anomolous to exempt its residents and citizens 
from the protection of a statute that protects the residents 
and citizens of both territories and states. 
So far as I have been able to determine, it has 
never been expressly held that the Fourteen Amendment applies 
to Puerto Rico - or, for that matter, to territories in general. 
---------------I do not think we need to resolve that question here. Section 
1983, by its terms, applies to territories. This coverage could 
be an exercise of Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
if that applie s to territories, or an exercise of its powers -under Article IV to assure equal protection of the laws under 
the due process clause, if it does not. In either case, if 
Congress intended and had the power to extend§ 1983 to 
territories, it should have the same power to extend it to 







In Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970), 
the Court held that a Puerto Rican statute was not a "State 
statute" within 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), which permits appeals from 
federal appellate decisions holding state statutes unconstitutional. 
This ruling was described in Calero-Toledo as being attributable 
to the close relationship between 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1257. 28 U.S.C. § 1258, which provides for direct Supreme 
Court review of decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 
corresponded to§ 1257, but there was no similar corresponding 
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Examining Board of Engineers, 
Architects and Surveyors, 
etc,, et al., Appellants, 
v. 
Maria C. Flores de Otero and 
Sergio Perez N ogueiro. 
On Appeal from thEt 
United States District 
Court for the DistriCi 
of Puerto Rico, 
[May ..-, 1976] 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK;MU~ delivered the opinion of th~ 
Court. · 
This case presents the issue whether the United Statee 
District Court for the Distriet of Puerto Rico possesses 
jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3),: to entertain 
a suit based upon 42 U. S. C. § 1983,2 and, if the answer 
1 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343 provides : 
"The district courts shall have origip.al jurisdiction of any civil 
·action authorized by law to be commended by any person: 
" (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, ·of any right, privi~ 
lege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States 
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or 
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United St11,tes . .. . " 
2 Title 42 U, S, C. § 1983 provides : 
"Every person . who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu~ 
lation, custom, or usage, of any State 2.r Territ.ory, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of tqe United States , or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof t.o the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or imm~nities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
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2 EXAMINING BOARD v. FLORES DE OTERO 
is in the affirmative, the further issue whl')ther Puerto 
Rico's restriction, by statute, of licenses for civil engi-
neers to United States citizens is constit4tional. The 
first -issue; phrased another way, is wliether Puerto Rico 
is· a "State,'' for ·purposes of§ 1343 (3), insofar as that 
·statute speaks of deprivation "under color of any State 
l&w"; the resolution of t~at question was relil0rved in 
Calero-Toledo v.~Pearson Yq,cht Leasing Co., 4l6, u.-s. 
'663, 677 n. 11 (1974). 
I 
A. Puerto Rico's Aot of May 10, 1951~ No. 399, as 
amended, now codified as P. R. L~ws Ann., Tit. 20, 
·§§ 681-710, relates to the practic~ of engineering, .archi-
tecture, and surveying. The administration a.nd enforce-
ment of the statute, by § 683, are committed to the 
Commonwealth's Board of Examiners of Engineers, 
Architects, and Surveyors, an appellan.t here. Section 
689 3 sets forth the qualifications "for registration as 
3 The statute in pertinent part reads: 
· ''§§ 89. Qualifications for registration in the Board's registry 
"Af,, minimum evidence, satisfactory to the Bo!i,I'd, to show that 
• the applicant meets the qualifications for registration as licensed 
engineer, architect or surveyor, . .. the Board shall accept, as the 
- ~maybe: 
" (2) For lice~ engineer or architect: 
"(a) Graduatum, examination and minim~m experience. A cer-
•tification accrediting his graduation from a course or curriculum of 
enigneering or architecture, of a duration of not less than four ( 4)' 
' academic years or its equivalent, whose efficacy has been adequately 
verified, in any university, college or institute whose stanqing and 
· proficiency are accepted by the Board ; passing of written examina--
tions (validation) on the fundamental subjects of engineering or 
architecture; arid a · detailed history of his professional experience 
of not less than four years, acquired after his graduation as a pro-
fessional, satisfactory to the Board, and showing, in the judgment 
.Qf too Board, that the applicant is qualified to practice as engineer 
- -
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]icenseq. engineer, arcl\itect or sur,veyor." For a "licen~d 
engineer or !l,rchitect," these qu~itic~tion$.include a spec-
ified ed~cation, the pa,ssing of a written examination~ 
or architect with a degree of professioruu responsibility whii:h justi-
fies his licensing. . . . 
"In aqdition to what has already befln provicjed in this section, 
it shall be required that applicants for registration in the Bo~rd's 
:,registry be citizens of the United States of America and reside in 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for µot less thap one year pefore-
fi'ling their applicatioflS. Provided, that the requisite of being a 
citizen of the United States qf America shall not apply to epgineers, 
architects and surveyors who have ~tudied · the total CQllrsflS ~ 
have received their corresponding grade 01: certificate i;{1 th~ Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico provided that the approved cou~ of 
study and' institution where he ha$ studied fulfill the qua,lifications-
fixed by sections 681-710 of this title, as the case may be; Pro-
vidld, Tqat the applicants shall meet all the Qllalificatiops fixed by 
this act for registration in the Bo11,rd'l! registry . . 
"The requisi~ of residence and Uµited State;; citi1)enship shall 
not apply to epgineers, architects or surveyors whom the different 
agencies or instrumentalities of tlie Government . of the Conunon-· 
wealth, the municipal governments ·and th!l public COl'pqra.tions 
employ or may wish to employ, it being understood that it shall 
not be necessary that the a~plicants be iio employed at the tiµie of 
their application or registr11,tion in the Board's registry. 'fhe 11,ppli-
Clµl_ts shall meet all the other qualifiOll-tiof\s fixed by sections 681.:..710: 
of this title for registration in the l3oard's registry. 
"Upon compliance with these requiremen~ by a noncitizen of 
the United States of America, the board shall issue a conditional 
certificate as graduate engineer, architect or surveyor or a condi-
tiorntl license as engineer, 'architect or surveyor, as t~e <Jll8e may 1:>e, 
valid for the practicing of such professions only in the pel'formance, 
of their employment and during the time they are employed by the• 
above-mentioned. public entities . . . . ' 
"Any engineer, architect or surveyor holding a conditional license• 
or graduate engineer or achitect with a conqitional certifiCllte whoi 
obtains the citizenship of the Unjted States of America shall be• 
entitled to apply for reregistration and be reregistered in the Board'!s· 
registry a.s a graduate engineer ot architect, or a licensed engineer 
- -
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and a stated minimmn practioiil experience. The statute 
also requires that a,n, a Ii fo re · tration be a 
c trnen o tlie nited States. H, however, exe:rµpts ii.n 
otherwise qu 1 a ~en r m the citizenship require-
ment if he has "studied the totlll oomises" in the 'Com-
monwealth, or if he is'employed ·by an agency or instru-
me11tality .of the Government of the CoJllfilonwealth or 
'by a municipal government or public corporation there ; 
in the CjiSe of such employment, the alien receives a con-
ditional license valid only during the time he is employed 
by the public entity. · 
B. Matia C. Flores de Otero is a native of Mexico and 
a lega residen of Puerto Rico. 'Sh~, a 
c1v1 e;ngineer. She is no a U:p.ited States citizen. In 
_ June 1972 she applied to the Board for registration as a 
licensed engineer. It is undisputed that the applicant 
met all the specifications of for:rnal education1 examina-
tion, apd practice required for · licensure, except that of 
'United States citizenship. The Board deniecl her appli-
. cation llntil she furnished proof of that citizenship. · 
In October l973 de Otero institu'ted a,n action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Puerto 
Rico ag1tinst the Boarq and its indiviclual rµempers. She 
asserted jqrisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) ,4 and 
~lleged that th.e citizenship requirement was violative of 
her rights under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. A 
declaratory Judgmen a.n mJunctive relie were requested. 
In their answer to de Otero's complaint, the defend-
ants alleged that the United States District Court lacked 
or architect, or a licensed surveyor, as the case may be, in accord-
ance with aU the other requirements of the Board.1' 
4 Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) was 
not asserted. The defendants, who are appellants here, acknowledge 
that they "are not here concerned with the general jurisdiction of 
the local [federal] DJStrict Court under statutes such as 28 U. S. Cp 
:t33L" Brief for Appellant.s 6, 
- -
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jurisdiction to enterta.in the complainh and that the 
provisions of § 689 did not contravene rights secured 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or any 
rights guaranteed to de Otero under the Constitution. 
They also alleged tha,t de Otero had adequate remedies 
available to her in the courts of Puerto llico and that 
she had not exhausted those remedies. They requested 
that the court "abstain from a!JSUming jur~sdiction in 
this case and allow the Courts of the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico the opportunity to pass upon the issues 
raised by plaintiff." App. 5 . . 
C. Sergio Perez N ogueiro is a native of Spain and a 
legal resident of Puerto Rico. H~ 
c~sses degrees from uniyersiti~s in 
Spain and Colombia and from the University of Puerto 
Rico. He is not a United States citizen. He, like 
de Otero, met all the specificatio:ns of formal educa,tion, 
examination, and practice required for licensure, except 
that of United States citiienship. :fie is presently em-
ployed as an engineer by the Public Works DepaM,ment 
of the Municipality of Carolina, Puerto Rico, aqd holds 
~ conditional license ~ranted by the Board, as authorized 
by § 689, after he passed the required examina,tion.5 
In May 1974 Nogueiro instituted an action ~ainst the 
<ll The certification given appellee Nogueiro reads in part: 
"That the approval of this examination grants him the right to 
practice ENGINEERING solely and exclusively as an eµiployee of 
Agencies and im,tl'limentalities of'the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
Municipal Governments and Public Corporations. 
"I, FURTHER CERTlFY: That the limitation imposed on MR. 
SERGIO PEREZ NOGUEIRO right to practice Engineering are 
those required , .. because of !\is citizenship. MR. SERGIO 
PEREZ NOGUEIRO is _entitled to be automatically registered as 
an ENGINEER without limitations as soon as he presents the 
Naturalization Certificate as American Citizen." App. &-9. 
- -
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Board 11 in the United States District Coqrt for the Pis .. 
trict of Puerto Rico. He assert,ed that the citizenship 
requirem~nt "is repugnant to the Due Process Cl~use of 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments." App, 10. The 
complaint in all relevant respects was like that filed by 
de Otero; and Nogue1ro, too, requested declaratory and 
injunctive relief, including ~ full &nd unconditional 
license to practice as iin engineer in the Comn:\onwe~th. 
D. A three-judge court wt,tS convened to hear' de 
Otero's case. It qetermined tliat it had jurisdiction ------------under § 1983 and § 13,¼3. It concluded that absention 
was unnecessary because § 689 Wi:\S unambiguous and 
not susceptible of an interpre~tion that would obviate 
the need for reaching the constitution11l question. On 
the merits, with one j'qqge dissenting, it r~jected th.e 
justifications proffered by t~e cfefenqants for the citiz~n-
ship requiremept. It found that requirement unconsti-· 
tutional and directed the defend1:1-11ts to license de Otero, 
as an ef\gineer.' - F. Supp. - (1974j. 
In a separate and subsequent juc{~ent the same three- k 
judge court, by the same vote, granted Ii~ 
Nogueiro. It decreed tha.t h~, too, be licensed as an 
engineer. Juris. Statement 7a. , · 
Appeals were ta.ken qy the defendants from botp judg. 
ments, with a single jurisdictional sta,teinent pursuant 
to our ~ule 15.3. We noted prob~ble jurisdiction and' 
granted a stay of the execution anq. enforcement of the· 
judgments. 421 U. S. 986 (1975) , 
II 
On the jurisdictional issue, the appell1mts do not con .. 
tend that the United States ConstitutiQn hl:lS no applica-
11 The complaint was later ajllended to include the inclividuaJ_: 
11,Wmhe:cs Qf t.he Boa.rd as parties defenda.nt~ 
- -
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tion in Puerto Rico 1 or that claims cognizable under 
. § 1983 may not be enforced ther~. Instead, they argue 
that unless a complainant establishes the $10,000 juris-
d.ictional amount prescribed by 28 U. S. C. '·§ l~l (a),8 
a claim otherwise cognizable under § 1983 must pe ad-
, ' 
judicated in the courts of Puerto Rico.9 ; 
In approaching this question we are to e~irie the 
language of § 1343, the purposes of Congress in enfl,cting 
it, "and the circumstances under wh,ich the words were 
employed." 10 Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co. (P. R.), 
1 At oral argument, the appellants conceded that the "Fourteenth 
Amendment or the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the people of 
Puerto Rico." Tr, of Oral Arg. 5. 
8 Title 28 U.S. C. § 1331 (a) provides, 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 
of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and ar'ises under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of tfie United States." 
9 Brief for Appellants 6, 9-10; Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. 
10 Using this approach, the Court has helq (a) that the statutes 
of Puerto Rico are not "State" statutes for the rurpose of our 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2), Fornaris v. 
Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 42 n. 1 (1970) 1 and (b) that the 
statutes of Puerto Rico are "State'1 statutes for the purpose of the 
three-judge court provision of 28 l) . S. C. § 2?81, Cdlero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. 8. 663, 669-676 (1974) . The 
first decision was based upon the Court's practice to co;nstrue 
narrowly statutes authorizing appeals, and Congress' failure to pro-
vide a statute, parallel to 28 U. S. C. § 1258, authorizing appeals 
from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico under the 'same circum-
stances as appeals from the highest courts of the States, The 
second decision recognized the greater autonomy afforded Puerto 
Rico with its assumption of commonwealth status in the early 
1950's. Inclusion of the statutes of Puerto Rico within 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2281 served the purpose "of insulating a sovereign State's law from 
interference by a single judge." 416 U. S., at 671. See also Andres 
v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 745 (1948); Puerto Rico v. The 
Shell Co. (P. R .), Ltd., 30'2 U. S. 253, 257-259 (1937); and 
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Ltd., 302 U. S. 253, 258 (1937); District of Columbia ,y. 
Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 420 ({973). As is so frequently 
the case, however, the language is not free of l:lmhiguity, 
the purp~ appear to be diverse arid sometimes , oon-
tra<lictory, and the circqmstances ~re not fully 'sprefl,d 
upon the 'r-eco.rd, f~r our instruction. 
A. The federal ·civff'rights legislation, with w4ich we 
are here concef11__ , WM enac nearly 80 yeiµ-s before 
the 091\flict with Spai.µ anq the resulting establishment 
of the ties betwee!l Puerto· Rico a1id · the United Stfl.tes. 
Both § 1343 (3) and § 1983 hiwe· their origin ·in the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871 1 Tl,_ ti 'Stat. 13. Tpat 
statQte contained not only the sul:>~tantive provision pro-
tecting ~ainst "the ·deprivation of an;r rights, privileges, 
or immunities secureci by the Constitutipp" by any per-
son acting under color of state · law, but, as well, • the 
jQrisdictional provis1on authorizing a proceeding for the 
enforcement of those rights "to be prosecuted in :the 
several district or circ~it courts of the United States." 11 
11 The first $00tion of the 1871 Act proviqed: 
'
4'That arty persQn who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, . cwst,om, or usage of any Sta,te, shall subje(lt, or cause 
t6 be subjected, any ~on within the jurisdiction of the United'. 
Sta,tes to the deprivation of any ri~hts, privileges, or ipununities 
secured by the ConstitutiQI\ of the Uniteq Statffi, shall, aµy such. 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State 
to the contrary notwithstaµding, be liable to ~e party inhired in 
any action at law, suit in equity, or other prqper proceeding for 
redress; such prooeeqing to be prosecuted in t)le seyeral district or 
circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same-
rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided) 
in like cases in such courts, unqer the provisiolfS of the act of the• 
ninth of April, eighteen hundred and ~ixty-six, entitled 'An act to 
protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and 
:to furnish the means of their vindication'; and the other remedial 
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J urisdiction was not independently defined ; it WAS given 
simply to enforce th~ substantive rights cref\,teq by the 
statute. 'rhe two i,speots, se~mingly, were deemed to 
ooinQide. 
It h~ b~en S&i~ that the ~uq,gse of the legislatiQn WAS \ 
to enforce t~yji;ions of tµe Fourt,eel}th, not the 
Tbirtflliu_th, Arnendment. District of Columbia v. Carter, 
40~ U. S., at 423 ; Lynch v. [iousehald Financt Corp., 
405 U.S. 538,545 (1972); Mqnr(Je v. Prwe, 3&5 'U. S. 167, 
171 (l961). As origina,,lly enacw.d~ § 1 of the 1811 Act 
applied only to 1¥)tion under color of law of any '"StA,te." 
In 1874, however, Con ess, r>resum bl purs1.1M}t to its 
po~ to ''make al n clf 1 R. ·1es ~nd e ul~tfons :re-
-- ---- · · ..,I 
speoting t e Territory or other Propert belonging to 
the mted Stf\.tes," gran y e onstitution's AJ;lt. 
IV~~ed, wtthou~ explana..tion, the words "or 
Territory" in thei874 codific~t~on of United S~tes stat-
utes. Rev. Stat . § l 979 (1814). See District of Colur,i--
bia v. Carter, 409 -µ. S1., at 4:24 n. 11. The evident a,i~ 
was to insure that all persons residing in the territories 
not be denied, by pe~ns &oting 'ltnder color of territoria,I 
law, rights gufl,ra.nteed them by the Constitution and 




· Altho1..1gh one might say tha,t the purpose of Congress 
was evident, the method chosen to implement this aim 
was curjoqs and, indeed, SQlJlewh~t aoµf µsing. In the 
1874 codification, onl the sl.lbstantive ortibn (~~e pred-
ecessor of toda,y's § 1983) .of of 'the l871 Act was 
red~.13 I t bqme sepa.r"'ted frQm the -12 Another change effected with the codification, and wfthout ex-
pl11natio11, was the aqdition in J 1979 of t he words "!1-nd laws'' 
following the words "the Constitlltion." 
These changes were retained in § 1979 as it appett,red in Rev. Stat. 
(1878). 
13 Section 1979 provided: 
~'Every per~n who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu~ 
fcD Io/ Y-3 
- -
74-1267-0PINION 
10 EXAMINING BOARD v. FLORES DE OTERO 
jurisdictional portion ( the predecessor of today's § 13,tl 
(3)) whlch appeared as § 563 Twelfth and § 629 Six-
. teenth (concerning, respectively, the district courts and 
the circuit courts) of the ·Revised Statutei;. But the 
· words "or Territory" appeared only in § 1979; they did 
not appear in § § 563 and 629. 
Our question, then, is whether, in separately codifying I 
the provisions and in having this discrepancy between 
them, Congress intended to restrict federal court jurisdic-
tion in some way. W~µde that it intended IJ,O' 
such restriction. First, as stated above, the common ·--------------- ' origin of §§ 1983 and 1343· (3) in § 1 of the 1871 .Act 
\ 
suggests that the two provisions were -meant to be, and 
are, complementary. Lynch v. Household Ftnance· 
Corp., 405 U. S., at 543 n. 7. There is no indic&tion 
that Congress intended to prevent federal district a,nd· 
circuit courts from exercising subject matter juriadiction 
of claim1'! of deprivation of rights und~r color of terri-· 
torial law if they otherwise had personal jurisdiction of' 
the parties. Second; a contrary interpretation necessarily 
would lead to the conclusion thfl,t persons residing in a 
territory were not effectively afforded a federal court', 
remedy there for a violation of the 1871 Act despite· 
Congress' obvious intention to afford one. The then-
existing territorial district courts established by Congress· 
were granted '!the same jurisdiction, in all cases ;:trising · 
under the Constitution and the laws of the Uniteq States, 
as is vested in the circuit and district courts of tl1e United 
States." E,ev. St.at. § 1910 ( 1874) ( emphasis aqd~d) .14 
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes · 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person· 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution a.pd laws, shall 
be liable to the party mjured in an action at law, suit in equity,. 
~ or other proper proceedmg for redress," 
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Thus, if the federal district and circuit courts had juris-
diction to redress deprivations only under color of state 
(but not territorial) law, the territorial courts were 
likewise so limited. Further, the United States district 
courts for the Districts of California and Oregon, and 
the territorial district court for Washington possessed 
jurisdiction over violations of laws extended to the Terri-
tory · of Alaska. Rev. Stat. § 1957 (1874): Unless the 
federal courts had jurisdiction to redress deprivations of 
rights by persons acting under color of territorial law, 
Congress' explicit extension of the 1871 Act to provide a 
remedy against persons acting under color of territorial 
law was only theoretical because no forum existed in 
which these rights might be enforced. 
This conclusion that Congress granted territorial courts I 
jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of § 1979 is 
strengthened by two additional factors. First, Congress 
explicitly provided: "The Constitution and all laws of 
the United States which are not locally inapplicable 
shall have the same force and effect within all the orga-
nized Territories, and in every Territory hereafter 
organized as elsewhere within the United States." Rev. 
Stat. § 1891 (1874). Section 1979, with its r~ference 
to territories was obviously a.n applicable statute. Sec-
ond, it was not until the following year that Congress 
conferred on United States district courts general federal 
Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and 
Wyoming. The Territory of Washington was governed by Rev. 
Stat. § 1911 (1874), which provided, in part, that its territorial 
district courts shall have "the same jurisdiction in all cases arising 
under the Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the 
Territory, as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the 
United States." It will be noted that the quoted language does not 
include the words "and laws" after "Constitution." Section 1910, 
in contrast, did. The omission was soon rectified, however. Rev, 
·stat. § 1911 (1978). 
- -
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question jurisdiction.15 Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 
Stat., Pt. 3, 470, now .codified as 28 U, S. C. § 1331 (a). 
See generally Zwickler v. Kobta, 389 U. S. 241, 245-247 
(1967). Accordingly, unless ip 1874 the federal qistrict 
and circuit courts had jurisdiction to redress depriy1:1,tions 
under color of •territorial law: Congress, altll-04gh. provid-
ing rights and remeaie·s, coulq. be said to .have ·fo,1led to 
provide a means for their enforcement. 
For all these ~easons, we · conclude . that the ·federal 
territorial as well as the feder.al district and circuit courts 
generally had jurisdiction to redress...depriyations of con-
stitutional righ~ by persons acting ,under color of terri-
torial law. W~ tu1;1 t~n, to the legislation specifically 
applicable to Puerto Rico. · , . 
~ was .taken by Congress ,in . its 
establishment of the civil government in Puerto Rico 
in the exerci~ of its ter.ritorial power ·under Comit . Art. 
IV, § 3, cl. 2.1-6 By the Treaty o,f Paris, 30 Stat. 1754 
1 5 Original "arising under" jurisdi.ctipn was vested in the federal 
courts by the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, .2 St_at. 92, but was repealed 
a year later by the Act of Mar. 8, 1$02, § 1, 2 Stat, 132. There 
was nothing further along this line '!lllti1 the Act of Mar. 3, 1875. 
See District of Co/,umbia v. Carter, 409 u: s. 418,427 n. 20 (1973) . 
Rev. Stat. § 5600 ( 187 4) provided : 
"The arrangement and classification of the several sections of 
the revision have been made for the pur·pose of a more convenient 
and orderly arrangement of the same, 11,nd therefore no inference or 
presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason 
of the Title, under which any particular section is placed." 
This provision lends some support to our conclusion that the failure 
to add the words "or Territory" to the jurisdictional successor of' 
§ 1 of the 1871 Act was mere legislative oversight. liad § 1 re-
mained intact, the words "or Territpry" would have been added to, 
the substantive part of § 1 while the jurisdictional part would have 
~- continued to read "such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several' 
district or circwt courts of the United States." 17 Stat. 1~, 
'16 The powers vested in Congress by Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2,. 
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(1899), Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States. 
Id., at 1755. Shortly therea.fter, the For11,ker Act, being 
the Act of April 12, 1900, 31 St!).-t. 77, became law. This 
legislation established a civil government for :Pu~rto 
Rico, including provisions for courts. The judicial struc-
ture so created consisted of a loc11,l court system with a 
supreme court, and, as well, of ·a federal district court.11 
The Act,§ 34, id., at 84, provided: "The [federal] district 
court . . . shall have, in addition to the ordinll,fy juris-
diction of the district courts of the United States, juris-
diction of all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the 
United States." 18 
U.S., at 430-431; National Bank v. Oount·y of Yankton, 101 U.S. 
129, 133 (1880); American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 
542 (1828). And in the case of Puerto Rico, the Tre11,ty of Paris, 
80 Stat. 1754, specifically provided: "The civil rights and political 
status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to 
the United States shall be determined by Congress." ! d., at 1759. 
Congress exercised its powers fully . Thus, by the Foraker Act, 31 
Stat. 77 (1900), the President was authorized to appQint, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, the Governor of Puerto Rico, and 
its chief executive officers, id., at 81; the justices of the Supreme 
Court of Puerto Rico, and the judge of the United States District 
Court there. Id., at 84. In addition, Congress reqµired that "all 
laws enacted by the [Puerto Rico J legislative assembly slutll be 
reported to the Congress of the United States, which hereby reserves 
the power and authority if deemed advisable, to annul the $8me." 
Id., at 83. 
11 This establishment of two separate systems of courts stands in 
contrast to other territorial legislation where -0nly one system of 
courts, including district courts and a supreme court,, was established 
and given the jurisdiction vested in United States, courts. See Rev. 
Stats.§§ 1864:-1869, 1910 (1874) . See also Palmore v. United States, 
411 u, s. 389, 402-403 (1973) . 
·18 Section 34 provided in relevant part: 
"That Porto Rico shall constitute a judicial district to be called 
'the district of Porto Rico.' The President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a district judge . . . for 
~,I 
? ) 
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On its, face, this appears to have been a broad grant 
of jurisdiction similar to that ,conferred on the United 
States district courts · and Qompara.ble to that conferred 
on the earlier territorial co9rts. _ Th.e earlier territorial 
grants, however, were -different. Whereas the federal 
district court for •Puerto Rico was to have "the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the district courts o·f the United States," 
the earlier territorial -courts had been given explicitly, by 
Rev. Stat. § 1910 no.ted ii.hove, ''the same jurisdiction, 
in all cases arising under tp.e Constitution and laws-· of 
the United States, .a&. is vested in the ci:roqit and district 
courts of the United States." _One might expect that 
the grant of jurisdiction in the former · necessarily en-
~d or was_ the sa~~ as the ·gr~nt of jurisdiction 
in the la~ how~vef, was divided over· tlw 
question whether the Constitution extended to Puerto 
Rico by its own force ·or whether' Congress possessed 
the power to withhold from Puerto 'Ricans the consti--
tutional guarant_ees available to all persons withip. the 
several States and· the earlier · territories. ' See· S. 'Rep .. 
No. 249, 56th' Cong., 1st Sess. (1900); H. R. Rep. No. 
249, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900) .1'9 
1 a term of four years, unless sooner removed by the President. Tlw· 
district oou.rt for said. district · shall 'be called the district court of 
the United States for Porto Rico . . . ani::l ·shaU have, in addition 
to the ordinary jurisdiction of <fistrict courts of the United States, 
jurisdiet-ion of all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United· 
States, and shall proceed therein in the same mamier as a circuit 
court." 31 Stat. 84. 
19 The report of the majority of the House Committee consider-
ing the legislation for Puerto Rico concluded : 
· "Upon the whole we conclude 
"First . That upon reason and authority the term 'United States,'' 
'. a,s used in the Constitution, , has 1reference only to the States that 
constitute the Federal Union and does not 'include Territories. 
"Second. That the power of Congress with f~pect to legislation: 
- ·,e 
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The division within Congress was reflected in the 
legislation governing Puerto Rico. Thus, despite some 
support for the measure, see S. Rep. No. 249, at l2-13, 
Congress declined to grant citizenship to the inhabit~nts 
of Puerto Rico. 33 Cong. ·Rec. 3690 (1900). And, in 
contrast to some earlier territorial legislation, Congress 
·did not expressly extend to Plletto Rico 'the Constitution 
of the United States or impose on the statutes of Puerto 
Rico then in effect the condition that they ·be continued 
·only if consistent with the United -States Constitution.20 
At the same time, however, Congress undoubtedly was 
aware of the above-mentioned B,ev. -Stat. § 1891 provid-
ing: "The Constitution and all laws of the United ·states 
which are not ·1ocally inapplicable shall have the same 
force and effect .. . in every Territory hereafter orga-
nized as elsewhere within the United States." Yet' no 
mention of this statute was · made in the Foraker Act. 
for the Territories is plenary." H. R, Rep. No. 249, 56th Cong., 
1st Sess., 16 (1900) . 
But see the minority report, id., at 17-20. This adopts by reference 
the views of Representative N ewlands: "The weight of authorities 
sustain[s] the proposition that the Constitution, ex proprio vigore, 
controls the action of the Government created by the Constitution 
wherever it operates, whether in States or Territories." Id., at 29. 
20 The Senate Committee considering the proposed legislation for 
a civil government in Puerto Rico surv13yed the previous territorial 
legislation to determine w;hen, and under what circumstances, the 
Congress had extended the Constitution to the territories. It con-
cluded that, as a rule, the organizatioll of a territory had not been 
accompanied by an extension of the Constitution. Not until · 1850, 
when Congress established a government for the Territory of, New 
Mexico, did it explicitly provide: "That the Constitution, and all 
laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, -shall 
have the same force and effect within the said Territory of New 
Mexico as elsewhere within the United States." Act of Sept. 9, 
1850, c. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452. See' S. Rep. No. 249, 56th Cong., 1st 
Sess ., 6 (1900) . This provision becamf;l the model for subsequep.t 
:territorial legislation . · · · 
- -
74-1267-0PINION 
16 EXAMINING BOARD v. FLORES DE OTERO 
In contrast, two years later, Congress made § 1891 e,c .. 
pressly inapplicable when it created a civil government 
for the Territory of the Philippines. Act of July 1, 
1902, c. 1869, § 1, 82 Stat. 69~.21 Moreover, Congress, 
by § 14 of tpe Foraker Act, extenqed to Puerto Rico 
"the statutory 113,ws [other than, the internal revenqe 
laws] of the United States not lpoally inapplicable," ' :u 
Stat. 80,22 and Rev. St~t. § 197.9, providing .remedies for 
deprivation of rights ,guaranteed by the Constitutiop 
and laws of the United States by ·p_ersons acting under 
color of territorial law was . at least potentially 
"applicable." 
21 "The provisions of section eighteen hundred and ninety-one of 
the Revised Statutes of eighteen hundred and seve:p.ty-eight shall ;not 
apply to the , Philippine Islands." 32 Stat. 692 (1902). Neverthe-
less, the people of the Philippines· were not left unprotected because 
Congress also provided them with a ' ~ill ,o( rights guaranteeing most 
of the basic protections afforded by the Constitution to persons 
within the United State.;. Id., at 692-693. See Kepner v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) . 
In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901), which presented this 
Court with its first opportunity to review the . constitutionality of 
the Foraker Act, Mr. Justice Brown referred to Rev. Stat. § 1891 
in his opinion but attached no significance to it. Id., at 257. , In 
contrast, the Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 143 
(1904) , relied on the 1902 Act'-s express exclusion of§ 1891, in hold-
ing that the Constitution, except insofar as required by its own 
terms, did not exiend to the Philippines. 
2~ This provision was continued as § 9 of the Organic Act' of 1917, 
39 Stat. 954 : "That the statutory laws of the United States not 
locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise 
provided, shall have the S(\me force and effect in Porto Rico as in 
the United States, except the internal-revenue laws." This is now 
part of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U. S. C. § 734. 
Although appellants contend that, for a variety of reasons, the· 
federal statutes ·with which we are concerned should not 11,pply to 
Puerto Rico, they do not argue that these statutes are "locally inap-
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This review of the Foraker Act and its legislative his- { 
tory leads to several conclusions: Congress was up.certain 
of its own powers respecting Puerto Rico a,nq of the 
extent to which the Constitution applied there. At the 
same time, it recognized, at least implicitly, that the 
ultimate resolution of these questions was , the respon-
sibility of this Court. S. Rep. No, 249, at 9~t~; H. R. 
Rep. N.o, 249, at 9-l5, 25-:;is. Thus Congress appears 
to have left the question of the persona!' rights to be 
accorded to the inhabitants of fqerto· Rico to orderly 
development by this Court anc{ to whatever further 
provision Congress itself might make for them. The 
grant of jurisdiction to the district court in Ptierto Rico, 
nevertheless, appeared to be sufficiently broa,d to ,permit 
redress of deprivations of those rights by persons acting 
under color of territorial law. See Insular Police Oom-
mision v. Lopez, 160 F. 2d 673, 676-677 (CAI), cert. 
denied, 331 U. S. 855 (1947). Nothing in the language 
of § 34 of the Foraker Act precludeq the grant of ju-
risdiction accorded the earlier territorial courts by Rev. 
Stat. § 1910, and its language, containing no limitations, 
cautions us against reading into it an exception not 
supported by persuasive evidence in the legislative 
history. · 
Subsequent legislation respecting Puerto Rico tends 
to support the conclusion that uncertainty over the 
application of the Constitution did not lead Congress 
to deprive the inhabitants of Puerto Rico of a federal 
forum for vindication of whatever rights did exi~t. In 
the Organic Act of 1917, sometimes known as the Jones 
Act, 39 Stat. 951, Congress made more explicit the juris-
diction of the federal district court by according it 
"jurisdiction of all cases cognizable in the district courts 
of the United States," § 41, id., at 965; generally granted 
Puerto Rico citizens United States citizenship, § 5, 
id., at 953 ; and codified for Puerto Rico a bill of rights, 
- -
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§ 2, id., at 951- 952. This bill of rights, which rema,ined 
in effect until 1952, provided Puerto Ricans with nearly 
all the personal _guarantees found in the United States 
'Constitution .23 .. ,The very first provision, for example, 
read : "That no law shall be enacted in Porto Rico which 
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due proc~ss of law, or deny to any person .therein 
the equal protection of the laws." Id., at 951. These 
words are almost ident~cal with the hinguage · of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and, when Congress sele~ted 
them, it must have done. so with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in mind and with a view to further developmep.t 
by this Collrt of the do(ltrines embodied in it. See l(.ep-
ner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 124 (1904), In its 
passage of the Jones Act, Congress -clearly set the stage 
for the f eder.al court in Puerto Rico to enforce the 
provisions of § ~983's predecessor ·(Rev. Stat. § 1979) 
which prohibited the deprivation "uµq.er coior of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us~e, of 
any .. . Territory ... of any rights, privileges, or im~ 
munities secured by the Constitution and laws." See 
Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F. 2d 
262, 264-266 (CAl) , cert. denied, 298 U. S. 689 (1936). 
The jurisdictional provision of the Act, referring to 
"all cases cognizable in the district coµrts of the United 
States," reJllain~d in effect untii 1948. At that · time 
Congress, in the course of a major revision of the Judicial 
Code, placed the nonterritorial jurisdiction of the dis~Jlict 
23 Section 2 of the Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951-952, left only two major 
exceptions : the right, under the · Fifth Amendment, not to ' 'be held 
to answer for a capital, or ·otherwise infamous crime, unlfiss on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury;" and the right, under 
the Sixth and Seventh Amendmepts, to a· jury trial. See f:Jalzac v. 
Porto Rico, 258 U. S. · 298, 306 (1922) ; S. ·Rep. No. 1779, 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950) ; H. R. Rep. No. 2~'(5, 81st Cong., 2<1 
St,,s., 2 (1950) , ' 
- -
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court of Puerto Ric9, as well as the district court of 
Hawaii, squarely within Title 28 of the United States 
Code. It provided: "Puerto Rioo constitutes one judi-
cial district." Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § U9, 62 
Stat. 889. The stated reason for th.is change was that 
"Hawaii and Puerto Rico are included as judicial dis-
tricts of the United States, since in mat,ters of jurisqic-. 
tion, powers, and procedure, they are in, all respects equal 
to other United States district courts." H. R. Rep. No. 
308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1947). This confirms our 
conclusion that until the establishrpent ·of the Common-
wealth, the federal district court in Puerto Rico ha.d the 
same jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 as that conferred by 28 . U. S. C. § l343 (3) and 
its predecessor statutes on the United States 'district 
courts in the several States. See Miranda v. United 
States, 255 F. 2d 9 (CAl 1958); Insular Poliae Commis-
sion v. Lopez, supra. 
Only two years later, Congress responded to demands 
for greater autonomy 24 for Puerto Rico with the Act of 
July 3, 1950, c. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950). This legisla-
tion, offered in the "nature of a compact" to "the people 
of Puerto Rico," § 1, 48 U. S. C. § 731b, ii,uthorized 'them 
to draft their own constitution which, · however, "shall 
provide a republican form of government and sh&ll in-
clude a bill of rights," § 2, 48 TJ. S. C. § -73lc;. The pro-
posed constitution thereafter submitted deciared that it 
was <lrafted "within our union with the United States of 
Ameri.ea," and tha~ ll,lllong the "determining factors in 
our life" were considered "our citizenship of the United 
States of America" and "our loyii,lty to ~he principles of 
the Federal Constitution." Preamble of the · Constitu-
24 In 1947 Congress had given the qualified voters of Puerto Rico 
the right to select their own governor by popular suffrage. • -Act of 
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tion of Puerto Rico, 1 P.R. Laws Ann. p. 207. See note 
following 48 U. S. C. § 731d. Congress app,roved the 
proposed constitution after addii).g, among other things, 
a condition that any amendment or revision of the docu-
ment be consistent with "the aJ)plicable provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States." . 66 Stat. -327 
(1952).25 The condition wa.s accepted, the compact be-
came effective, and Puerto Rico assumed "Common-
wealth" statqs. This resulted in the repeal of pumerous 
provisions of the Organic Act of 19i7, including the bill 
of rights that Act eontained. Act of July 3, 1950, c. 446, 
§ 5, -64 Stat. 320. The remainder became known &S' the 
Puerto Rican Feder~ Relations Act. § 4, id., at 3l9. 
The uestion then arises whether Congress, by ~nter-
ing into the compact, mtende to repe~l by implicat)on 
th~f the tecieral district court of Puerto 
Rico to en orce 42 U. . C. § 1983. e think not, As 
, was o served m alero- o 'aov.'Pearson Yacht Leasing 
Co., 416 U. S., at 671, the purpose of Congress in the 
1950 and 1952 legislation was to accord to Puerto Rico 
the degree of autonomy and independence normally asso-
. ciated with States of the Union, and that, . accor~ingly, 
25 The purpose of the condition was explained: 
"Applicable provisions of the United States Constitution alld the· 
Federal Relations Act will have the same effect as the Constitution 
of the United States has with respect to State constitutions or State 
laws. United States laws not locally inapplicable will have equal 
force ,and effect in Puerto Rico as throughout the States except as· 
otherwise provided in the Federal Relations Act. Any act of the· 
Puerto Rican Legislature in conflict with .•. the Constitution' of 
the United States or United States laws not locally inapplicable· 
would be null and void. 
"Within this framework, the people of Puerto Rico will exercise· 
elf-government. As regards local matters, the sphere of action 
and the methods of government 'bear a resemblance to that of any· 
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Puerto Rico "now" 'elects its Governor and legislature; 
appoints its judges, all cabinet officials, and lesser offi-
cials in the executive branch; sets its own educational 
policies; determines its own budget; and amends its own 
civil and criminal code.' " See generally Leibowitz, The 
Applicability of Federal Law to the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, 56 Geo. L. J. 219, 221 (1967); Mfl,gruder, 
The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. Pitt. 
L. Rev. 1 (1953); Americana of Puerto R-ico, Inc. v. 
Kaplus, 368 F. 2d 431 (CA3 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 
943 (1967). More importantly, the provisions relating 
to the j urisdietion of a federal distric,t court in Puerto 
Rico were left undisturbed, and there is no evidence in 
the legislative history that would support a determina-
tion that Congress intended such a departure. 26 In the 
absence of a change in the language of the jurisdictional 
provision or of affirmative evidence in the legislative 
history, we are unwilling to read into the 1952 legisla-
tion, a restriction of the jurisdiction of the federal district 
court. 
C. Our conclusion not to attribute to Congress an 
inclination to leave the protection of federal ri~hts ex-
26 Sub.sequent congressional legislation affecting the federal district 
court in Puerto Rico further confirms the conclusion that it pos-, 
sesses the same jurisdiction as that conferred on the federal district 
courts in the several States. By Pub. L. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764 
fl966') , the tenure of federal judges in Puerto Rico was made iden--
tical to that of other United States district judges. The reason, 
given for this amendment was that the federal district court in 
Puero Rico "is in its jurisdiction, powers, and responsibilities the· 
same as the U. S. district courts in the [several] States." S. Rep .. 
No. 1504, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966) ; see. also H. R. Rep. No .. 
135, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1965) . 
The complete identity of the responsibility of these courts was: 
effectuated in 1970, 84 Stat. ·298, when Congress repealed § 41 of 
the Act of Mar. 2, 1917, 39 Stat. 965, in the context of providing, 
additional Uriited States district judges ,throughout the United: 
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elusively to the local Puerto Rican courts is supported 
by District of Columbia v. Carter, supra. · Therethe 
Court held t a t e istric was neither a state nor a 
territory, within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The 
District, it was observed, occupies a unique statu:s within 
our system of government. It is the seat of the N ation{Ll 
Government, and, at the time the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 was enacted, Congi:_ess exei:_cised plenary power over 
its activities. These geographical and political consid-
erations, as well as "the absence of any indication in the 
language, purposes, -or history of § 1983 of a legislative 
intent to include the District within the scope of its 
coverage," supported the Court's conclusion. 409 U. S., 
at 432. 
Appellants, however, focµs upon the characterization 
of the District as "sui generis in our governmental struc-
ture," ibid., and argue that becallse the Commo'1wealth 
of Puerto Rico is also sui generis; the conduct of persons 
acting under color of Commonwealth law is similarly 
exempted from scrutiny under§ 1983.21 We readily con-
cede that Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the· 
United States that has no parallel in our history, but we 
think that it does not follow that Congres.s intended to 
relinquish federal enforcement of § 1983 by restricting 
the jurisdiction of the federal district court in Puerto· 
Rico. It was observed in Carter, 409 U. S., at 427, that 
27 Appellants ' argument rests in large part on Pal,more v. United· 
States, 411 _U. S. 389 (1.973), where, fo llowing thll rat ionale of 
Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co ., 400 U. S,, at 42 n. 1, the Court held that 
a statute of t he District of Columbia was not a state statute for the 
purposes or' 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) . Palmore does not suggest, how-
ever, that the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are to be 
treated identically in every respect . Indeed, there is no reason to, 
hold such a view, particularly in light of the fact that the sources 




EXAMINING BOARD v. FLORES DE OTERO 23 
Congress, in enacting the civil rights legislation with 
which we are concerned, recognized that it Hhad neither 
the means nor the authority to exert any direct control, 
on a day-to-day basis, over the actions of state officials," 
and that the "solution chosen was to involve the federal 
judiciary." Congress similarly lacked effective control 
over actions taken by territorial officials, although its 
authority to govern was plenary.28 The same practical 
limitations on Congress' effectiveness to protect the fed-
erally guaranteed rights of the inhabitants of Puerto 
Rico existed from the time of its cession and, 11,fter 1952, 
when Congress relinquished its control over the organiza-
tion of the local affairs of the island and granted Puerto 
Rico a measure of autonomy compar~ble to that pos-
sessed by the States, the need for federal protection of 
federal rights was not thereby lessened, Finally, § 1983, 
by its terms, applies to territories; Puerto Rico, but not 
the District of Columbia, obviously Wf\S one of these. 
Whether Puerto Rico is now considered a territory or a 
state, for purposes of the s,pecific question before us, 
28 "It is true, of course, that Congress also possessed plenary power 
over the Territories. For practical reasons, however, effective fed-
eral control over the activities of territorial officials was virtually 
imposible. Indeed, 'the territories were not ruled immediately from 
Washington ; in a day of poor roads and slow mails, it was unthink-
able that they should be. Rather, Congress left municipal law to 
be developed largely by the territorial legislatures, within the frame-
work of organic acts and subject to a retained power of veto. The 
scope of self-government exercised under these delegations was nearly 
as broad as that enjoyed by the States ... .' Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 
370 U. S. 530, 546 (1962) . . . . Thus, although the Constitution 
vested control over the Territories in the Congress, its practical con-
trol was both 'confused and ineffective,' making the problem of 
enforcement of civil rights in the Territories more similar to the 
problem as it existed in the States than in the District of Columbia.'' 
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makes little difference because each is included within 
§ 1983 and, therefore~ 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
It follows that the United States District Court for 
the District of Puerto Rico ha.s jurisdictiqn under 28 
U. S. C. § 1343 (3) to enforce the pr9visiops of 42 U, S. C. 
§ 1983. 
III 
Appellants, however, argue that the District Court 
shouldhave abstained from reachmg the merits of the 
constitutiona c aim. ornaris v. t ge Tool Co.,400 
U.~s cited as an ex~mple of abstention in 
a Puerto Rico context. We conclude that the District 
Court correctly determined that abstention was unneces-
sary. The case presents no novel question copcerning 
the judicially created abstention doctrine; it requires 
instead, only the applications of settled principles re-
viewed just last Term in Harris County Comm'rs Cpurt v. 
Moore, 420·U. S. 77 (1975) . 
Appellants urge that abstention was appropriate for 
two reasons. First, it is said that § 689 should be con-
strued by the Comonwealth courts in the light of § 1483 
of the Civil Code, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 31, § 41f4 
(1968) . This provision imposes li~bility on a contrac~or 
for defective construction of a building. We fail to see, 
however, how § 4124 in any way could affect the inter-
pretation of § 689 which imposes, with the exception$ 
that have ben noted, a requirement of citizenship for the 
licensing of an engineer. 
Appellants' second argument is that the Common-
wealth courts should be permitted to adjudicate the 
validity of the citizenship requirement in the light of 
§§ 1 and 7 of Art. II of the Puerto Ric0 Constitution, 
1 P . R. Laws Ann., Const., Art. II, §§ 1, 7 (l965). Sec-
tion 1 provides : "No discrimination shall be made on 
acount of race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condi-
- -
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tion, or political or religious ideas." Section 7 provides: 
"No person in Puerto Rico shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws." These constitutional provisions 
are not so interrelated with § 689 that it may be sai~, 
as in Harris County, that the law of the Commonwealth 
is ambiguous. Rather, the abstention issue. seems clearly 
controlled by Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 
(1971) , where, as it was said in Harris County, 420 U. S., 
at 84-85, n. 8, "we declined to order abstention where 
the federal due process claim was not complicated by an 
unresolved state law question, even though the plain-
tiffs might have sought relief under a similar provision 
of the state constitution." Indeed; to hold that absten-
tion is .required · because § 689 might conflict with the 
cited broad and sweeping constitutional provisions, would 
convert abstention from an exception into a general rule.20 
IV 
This takes us, then, to the particular Puerto · Rico 
statute before us. Does Puerto Rico's prohibition 
against an alien's engaging in the private prMtice of 
engineering deprive the appellee-aliens of "any rights, 
privilege13, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws," within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983?, 
A. The Court's decisions respecting the rights of the 
inhabitants of Puerto Rico have been neither ·•unambigu-
ous nor exactly uniform. The nature of this country's 
relationship to Puei;to Rico was vigorously qebated 
29 During oral argument appellants seemed to suggest, for the first 
time, that § 689 was ambiguous. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 36. This argl!--
ment is directed to the exception in § 689 for aliens · "who have 
studied the total courses and have received their corresponding· 
grade or certificate in the Commonwealth." The argument appears 
not to have been presented to the District Court. We conclude, also. 
that, for purposes of the present case, it is plainly without merit. 
- -
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within the Court as well as within the Congress.30 See 
Coudert, The Evolution of the poctrine of Territori~l 
Incorporation, 26 Colum. L. Rflv. 823 (1926). It is 
80 In a series of decisions that have come to be kµown as the 
Insular Cases, the Court createq the doctrine of incorporated and 
unincorporated territories, e. g., Del,ima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1 
(1901); Dool-ey v. United ,States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Arm8trong 
v. United States, 182 U. S. 243 (1901); Do1,Vnes v. Bidwell, supra. 
The former category encompassed those territories ·destined for st1J,te-
hood from the time of acquisition, and the Constitution Wf!S applied 
to them with full force. See, e. g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 
U.S. 516 (1905); but see· Jiawdii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197 (1903) . 
The latter category incl~ded those territories not possessing that 
anticipation of statehood. , As to thetn, only ''fundamental" consti-
tutional rig~ts were guaranteed to the inhabitants. Although . the 
question whether certain rights were or were not fundamental 
continued to provoke debate among the Members of the Court, it 
was clear th~t the Constitution was held not to extend ex p,ropria 
vigore to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. · 
The most significant of the Insular Cases is Downes v. Bidwell, 
supra, where the Court held that the :imposition by. Congress of 
special duties on Puerto Rican goods did not yiolate the requirement 
of Const., Art. I , § 8, cl. 1, that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises 
shall be uniform throughout the United States:>' 
The dfvision of opinion in the Congress over how, and to what 
e"1ent, the Constitution applied to Puefto Rico w~s reflected in. the 
Court's opinions in Downe~. Mr. Justice ~rown belie~ed that the 
question was whether Congress had extended the Constitution to, 
Puerto Rico ; Mr. Justice White, with whom J\lstices McKenna ·and' 
Shiras joined, propounded thii theory of incorpprated and unip.-
corporated territories; and Mr. Justice Gra,y was of the opinion 
tha.t the question was essentially a political one to be left to the· 
political branches of government. The Chief Justice, with whom 
Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham joined, dis,sented on the· 
ground that the Constitution applieq to Puerto Rico ex proprio 
vigore. Mr. Justice White's approach in Downes v. Bidwell was: 
eventually adopted by a urninimous ·cou~t in BaJ,zac v. Porto Rico, 
:258 U. S., at 312-313. 
Nor does it appear that the debate over the relationship of Puerto• 
Rico to the United States has ended even no)V. See Note, Inventive: 
- :·- : 
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clear now, however, that the protectiQps acorded by 
either the Pue Process Clause of fhe :Fift)l Amenqment 
or the Pue Process and Equ~l Protection Cliws~s of the 
Fourteentli Amendment ~pply to residents of P4erto 
Rico. The Court recogni:i;ed th.e applicj\bility of these 
guarantees as long agq ~ its c:lecisions in. Downes v. 
Bidwell, l82 U. S. 244; ,283-284 0901), and Balzac v. 
Porto Rico, 258 U. S. ~~8, 31_2 .... 313 0~22). The :prin-
ciple was reaffirmed anq strengthrned ip Reid v. Covert, 
354 U .. S. 1 (1957),31 E1,,nd then again in Calero-ToledP, 
supra, where we held th11-t iphabitants of Puerto :Jlico are 
protecwd, under either the FtfHi, Am~:qqment · or the 
Foqrtee:qth, from the official taking of proper'ty withoi.it 
due process of law. . 
The Court, however, thus far lias qeclined to say 
whether it is the Fifth Amenqment or the :Fourteenth 
which provides the prot~ction,3~ C(Lle110-Toledo, 4l6 
U. S., at 668-699, n. 5. · Once agj\in, we neecl not resolve 
that precise qu!clstion becaµ~, . irrespective of whicli 
amendment applies, the statutouy restrictiop on the abil-
Statesmapship vs. The Territorial Clsiuse: The CoJlStitutJopality of 
Agreemen~s Limiting Territorial Powen,, 60 Va. L. Rrv. 1041 ( 197 4): 
31 The Insular Ca{les served as precedent for J\oldings that a 
civilian dependent of an American serviceman stationed abroad could 
be tried ,by an American coljrt-martial 'for offenses ·comtpltted in a 
foreigp country. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U. S. 470 (1956); Reid v. 
Covert, 351 U. S. 487 (1956) . . The announce111ent i,n those cases 
that the Constitution applied with full forcr only in the St~tes co111-
prising the Union and in incorporated territories was overruled, 
however, only a year litter when the Col!rt granted petitions fo,r 
rehearing, arrived at tµe opposite result, and withdrew the earlier 
opinions. Reid v. Covert, 354 V-8. 1 (1957) . · 
· 32 The United States Court of AP;IIB!t!s for the First Circ~it, of 
which Puerto Rico is a part, 2S U. S. C. § 41, similarly has qeclined 
to make that determination. E. g., Colon-Rosich v. Puerto Rico, 256 
F. 2d 393, 397 (1958}; Stagg, Matl:ier & Hough v. Descqrtes, 2# 
F. 2d 578, 583 (1957) ; Mora v. Meji(J,81 :3.06 f. 24 377, 382 (1953). 
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ity of aliens to engage in the otherwise lawful private 
practice of civil engineering is plainly unconstitutional, 
If the Fourtenth Amendment -is aplicl:\,ble, the Eq·ual 
Protection Clause nullifies the statutory exclusion. If, 
on the other hand, it is the Fifth Amendment and its 
Due Process Clause that applies, the statute's discrim-
ination is so egregious that it falls within the rule of 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1~54).88 See also 
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964). 
B. In examining the validity of Puerto Rico's virtu~lly 
complete ban on the private practice of civil engineering 
by aliens, we apply the standards of our recent decisions 
in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 ( 1971) ; Sugar-
man v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); and In re Gtiffeths, 
413 U. S. 717 (1973). These cases establish that state 
cla.ssifications ba.sed on alienage are subject to "~trict 
judicial scrutiny." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 
376. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, - U.S. - (1976): Stat-
utes containing classifications of thjs kind will be upheld 
only if the State or territory imposing them is· able to 
sati.sfy the burden of demonstrating "that its purpose or 
inte:rest is both constitutionally permissible and substan-
tial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary ... 
to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the S{l,feguarding 
of its interest." In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721-722' 
(footnotes omitted). These principles are f-1.,pplicable to 
the Puerto Rico statute now under consideration. 
The underpinnings of the Court's constitutional deci .. 
88 "[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both 
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually 
exclusive. The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit 
safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of la:w,' and, 
therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable 
phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be· 
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." !Jolting V. Sharp§,. 
347 u. s. 497, 499 (1954). 
~ 
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sions defining the circumstances under which state and 
local governments may favor citizens of this country by 
denying lawfully admitted aliens equal rights El,nd oppor-
tunities have been t wo. The first, b~d squarely on the 
concepts embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, recognizes that "[a]liens ~ a 
class are a prime example · of a 'discrete and insular' 
minority ... for whom . .. heightened judicial solicitude . . 
'is appropriate." Graham v. R ichar:dson, 403 U. S., at 
372. See also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642. 
The second, grounded in the Supremacy Chwse, Const., 
Art. VI, cl. 2, and in the naturalization power, Art. 11 
§ 8, cl. 4, recognizes the Federal Government's primary 
responsibility in the field ofimmigration 11,nd naturaliza,. 
tion. See, e. g., Hines v. Davidowitz, .312 U. S. 52, 66 
(1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U .. S. 33, 42 (1915) . See 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 378; Takahashi v. 
Fish & Game Comm'n, ·334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948) . 
Official discrimination against lawfully admitted aliens 
traditionally has taken several forms. Aliens have been 
prohibited from enjoying public resources or receiving 
public benefits on the same basis as citizens. See 
Graham v. Richard~on, supra; Takahashi v. Fish ~ Game 
Cornm'n, supra. Aliens have been excluded from public 
employment. Sugarman v. Dougall, supra. See M. 
Konvitz, ThP Alien and the Asiatic in American Law., 
c. 6 ( 1946) . And aliens have been restricted . from en~ 
gaging in private enterprises and occupations that are 
otherwise lawful. See In re Griffiths, supra ,· Truax v. 
Ra·ich, supra; Y ick W o v. Hop kins, 118 U, , S. 356, 369 
(1886).34 
84 Sta.tes al<io have placed restrictions on the devolution of real 
property t1, alie"", see Hauen~tein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 (1880); 
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The present Puerto Rico statute, of course, falls into 
the last category, It is with respect to this kind of dis-
cr.imiuat1011 that the States have had the greatest diffi-
culty iu persuading this Court that their interests are 
subst~ntial and constitutionally permissible, and that the 
discriminat10n is necessary for the saf egt,1!Ll'ding of those 
interests. Thus, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins the Court struck 
down an orrunance that was administered so as to exclude 
aliens from pursuing the lawful occupation of a laundry. 
In Truax v. Raich the Court inv~Jidated a state statute 
that required a private employer, having five or more 
workers, to employ at least 80 % qualified electors or 
native born citizens. And in In re Griffi ths a state statu-
tory requiremept prescribing United States citizenship 
as a condition for engaging 'in the practice of law was 
held unconstitutional. But see Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. 
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 . (1927). 
The reason for this solicitude with respect to an alien's 
engaging in an otherwise lawful occupation is apparent : 
"It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose 
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. If this 
could be refused solely upon the ground of race 
or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any 
person of the equal protection of the laws would 
be a barren form of words." Truax v. Raich, 239 
U.S., at 41 (citations omitted) . 
It is true that in Truax the Court drew a distinction 
between discrimination against aliens in private lawful 
occupations and discrimination against them where, it• 
equal rights and opportunities to acquire and own land, see Terrace· 
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:piight be said, the State has a speGial interest in afford-
ing protection to its own citizens. Id., at 39-40. That 
distinction, however, is no lonser so sharp as it then was. 
Recently the Court ha& taken ' a more restrictive view of 
the powers of a nonfederal polity to discriminate against 
noncitizens with respect to public e.rnployment, cozµpare 
Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) , aff'g People v. 
Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 2d 427, and Hei;n v. 
McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), with 81.{,garman v. Dougall, 
supra; and with respect to the distribution pf public 
funds and the alloc11,tion of public resources, compare 
k(cCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), and Patsone 
v'. Pensylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914), with Graham v. 
Richardson, supra, and Takahashi v. Fish & Gam~ 
Comm'n, supra. 
We do not suggest, however, that a State, territory or 
local government, or certainly the Federal Government, 
may not be pe~mitted some discretion in determining 
the circumstances under which it will employ aliens or 
whetµer 13rliens may receive public benefits or partake 
pf public resources on the same basis as citizens. In 
each case, the goverpmental interest cl11,imed to j~stify C 
the qiscrimination is to be carefully examined in order 
to determine whether th t interest is le itimate and 
subst~ntial, an~ inqmry must e made whetp~r the 
~opted to achieve the goal 11,re necesary 13rnd pre- ( 
cisely drawn. A classification based on citizenship, and 
imposed by a nonfederal polity, as has been said, is sub-
ject to strict judicial scrutiny. 
~
In the present case the appellants have offered three 
justi~cations for Puerto Rko's almost total ban of alieps 
from engaging in the private practice of engineering: The 
:first is to prevent the "uncontrolled" influx of Spanish• 
spealdng aliens into the field Ill Puerto Rico. The sec .. 
ond is to raise the prevailing low· standard of living. 
- -
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The third is to provide the client of a civil engineer an 
assurance of financial accountability if a building for 
which the engineer is responsible collapses within 10 
years of construction. P. R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 4124. 
The first justification amounts to little more than an 
assertion that discrimination may be justified by a desire 
to discriminate. This interest is unpersuasive on its face, 
It is also at odds with the Federal Government's primary 
power and -responsibility for the regulation of immigra-
tion. Once an alien is lawfully admitted, a nonfederal 
polity may not justify the restriction of the alien's liberty 
on ' the ground that it wishes to control the impact or 
effect of federal immigration laws. Compare DeCanas 
v. Bica, - U. S. - (1976). 
Although the second broad justification proffered by 
the appellants has elements of substance and legitimacy, 
the means drawn to achieve the end are neither· neces-
sary nor precise. What the Commopwealth h¥ done by 
its statute is to require private employers and contractors 
to hire only engineers who are American citizens. This 
end was held impermissible over 50 years ago in Truax v. 
Raich, supra. To uphold the statute on the basis of 
broad economic justification of this kind would permit 
any State to bar the employment of aliens in any or all 
lawful occupations. 
Finally, the asserted purpose to assure responsibility 
for negligent workmanship sweeps too broadly. United 
States citizenship is not a guarantee that a civil engineer 
will continue to reside in Puerto Rico or even in the 
United States, and it bears no particular or rational rela-
tionship to skill, competence, or financial responsibility. 
See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 645; In re Grif~ 
fiths , 413 U. S., at 724. Puerto Rico has available to it 
other ample tools to achieve the goal of an engineer's fi. 
nancial responsibility without "indiscriminately prohibit-
- -
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ing the private practice of civil engineering by a class of 
otherwise qualified professionals. 
The judgments of the Court of Appeals ~ e affirmed. 
It :<; so ordered. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no p~rt in the considera~ 
tion or decision of this case. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTT ER STEWART 
- -
~u.prmtt ~curt cl ifrt ~nittlt .§taus 
';mru;fring-hm. 1E}. ~. 20.;rJ!-,3 
May 4, 1976 
N?. 74-1267 , Examining Board v. de Otero 
Dear Harry, 
I meant to say in my earlier letter 
to you today that I did not see any unresolv-
able tensions between your opinion in this case 
and John's opinions in Mow Sun Wong and Diaz, 
but that I confidently assume that you and~ 
can resolve any semantic inconsistencies that 
may appear . 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
r?c 
' / I I/ 
- -
~u:µ-rtmt QJou:rt of tfrt 'Jllnittb ~tatta-
~aa-lp-ngton. 10. <!}. 2llpJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE P OTTER STEWART 
May 4, 197 6 
Re: No. 74-1267, Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero 
Dear Harry, 
I agree in general with your very thorough opinion for 
the Court in this case. I am not sure, however, that I under-
stand the meaning of the phrase "nonfederal polity" as used 
twice on page 31. It would help me if the word "state" were 
substituted for that phrase in line 5 on page 31. It would also 
help me if the last sentence of the full paragraph on page 31 
could be changed along the following lines: "A classification 
based on citizenship, not stemming from congressional power 
over immigration and naturalization, is subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny. " 
Perhaps these suggested revisions would substantially 
change the meaning you intended. If so, I would be glad, 
of course, to discuss my problems further with you. 
lV"ir. Justice Blackmun 






,jnpi-mu <!fom-t ttf t1r~ ~~ ,jtaus 
~aglp:ttgfmt. ~. <lf. 2ll.;i'!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
May 4, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1267 - Examining Board of Engineers 
v. Flores de Otero 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
fl~ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to Conference 
- -~tlM <!Jonrl of tltt ~nit.th ~hdtg 
-ru.lp:ngfott. ~. <!J. 2llffe)l., 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
May 4, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1267 - Examining Board of Engineers 
v. de Otero 
Dear Potter: 
I 
This is in response to your letter of today. Bill 
Brennan has also called. 
I shall be glad to replace the words 11 nonfederal polity 11 
with the word 11State 11 on line 5 of page 31. I am inclined now 
to omit the last sentence of the full paragraph on page 31. I 
hope that this will eliminate any problem that exists with respect 
to it. 
I am having the Print Shop rerun the opinion with these 
changes and with corrections of a number of typographical 
errors that appeared in the first draft. 
Sincerely, 
I~ -------
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
P. S. I spoke with John this morning about possible impact be-
tween de Otero and Mow Sun Wong and Diaz. John tells 
me that he felt there was nothing inconsistent. This is 
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May 27, 1976 
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I.. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
✓ 
- -.§u:prmu <qomt of Ur~ 'Janitth ~taus 
1Nas fr:ngLm, }B. "t· 20'?J!. ~ • 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 1, 197 6 
Re: No. 74-1267 -- Examining Board of Engineers, 
Architects and Surveyors v. Maria C. Flores de Otero 
and Sergio Perez N ogueiro 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~ i'l . 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -.ittJTrmtt <!ftturt ttf i:4t ~th .:$htlt6 
JhtGJrin:g~ ~. <!f. 2ll,;r'!-~ 
June 1, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1267, Examining Bd. 
v. Flores de Otero 
Dear Harry, 
This will confirm that I join 
your opinion for the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
~ /' 
, ·~,'"? ( 
/ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
.§u:.prmtt (qo-url irf tltt ~h .§tatts 
~ru!lpnghttt. ~. l!f. 20gi-'¼~ 
/ 
June 1 0, 1 9 7 6 
Re: 74-1267 - Examining Board of Engineers v. de Otero 
Dear Harry: 
I j1oin your proposed opinion. 
Ri~,~ 
Mr. - Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
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